Student-to-Student Diplomacy: Chinese International Students as a Soft-Power Tool by Bislev, Ane
www.ssoar.info
Student-to-Student Diplomacy: Chinese
International Students as a Soft-Power Tool
Bislev, Ane
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bislev, A. (2017). Student-to-Student Diplomacy: Chinese International Students as a Soft-Power Tool. Journal of
Current Chinese Affairs, 46(2), 81-109. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10689
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence
(Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0
Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs 
China aktuell 
 
 
 
 
Bislev, Ane (2017), Student-to-Student Diplomacy: Chinese International 
Students as a Soft-Power Tool, in: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 46, 2,  
81–109. 
 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10689 
 
ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print) 
 
The online version of this article and the other articles can be found at: 
<www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> 
 
 
Published by 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, in  
co-operation with the Lau China Institute at King’s College London, and Hamburg 
University Press. 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <ias@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is part of the GIGA Journal Family, which also 
includes Africa Spectrum, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs and Journal of 
Politics in Latin America: <www.giga-journal-family.org>. 
 
 
 
  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 2/2017:  81–109 

Student-to-Student Diplomacy:  
Chinese International Students as a
Soft-Power Tool 
Ane BISLEV 
Abstract: Chinese international students have become an increasingly 
visible presence around the globe, and interest in these students has 
consequently increased among universities, researchers, and policy-
makers, who often see international students as a source of increased 
soft power. This article questions the idea of Chinese international 
students as a soft-power tool. This is done through a critical discus-
sion of the concept of soft power and the rather limited research on 
educational diplomacy, demonstrating that the analytical vagueness of 
the concept of soft power leads to an oversimplified understanding of 
the linkage between international students and soft power. In order to 
provide a more nuanced understanding of this linkage, the article 
examines the actual overseas experience of Chinese international 
students and argues that the linkage between international students 
and soft power is highly complicated and that these students do not 
necessarily constitute soft-power resources. 
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Introduction 
Strengthen the Propagation of the Chinese Dream Abroad 
Harness the patriotic capabilities of overseas students, establish an 
overseas propaganda model which uses people as its medium and 
the sharing of personal ideas as its instrument, and create a propa-
ganda effect where everybody plays a role, where every individual 
acts as a people-to-people ambassador, and where every sentence 
uttered easily reaches the hearts and minds [of foreign publics]. 
(Ministry of Education 2016) 
In February of 2016, the Chinese Ministry of Education published a 
new directive on how to strengthen patriotic education in the Chinese 
educational system. Towards the end of the document, the directive 
suggests creating a network integrating domestic and foreign students 
and experts to propagate knowledge about the development of “the 
fatherland,” thereby casting all Chinese overseas students in the role 
of potential “people-to-people ambassadors.” The interest in over-
seas students as a public-diplomacy tool and soft-power resource 
coincides with a record number of both Chinese students going 
abroad and foreign students coming to China. According to data 
from UNESCO, more than 700,000 Chinese students were studying 
abroad in 2015 (UNESCO 2016), while just under 400,000 foreign 
students were enrolled in Chinese universities in 2014 (Institute of 
International Education 2014).  
The idea of using international students to reach the hearts and 
minds of foreign publics is interesting for a number of reasons. First, 
it clearly illustrates the Chinese government’s increasing interest in 
using non-governmental elements in its public diplomacy as well as 
its focus on projecting correct knowledge about China as a way of 
eradicating potential misunderstandings. Second, while international 
students are often presented as a source of increased soft power (see, 
for instance, Nye 2004; Atkinson 2010; McClory 2016), the focus is 
usually on the benefits accrued by the host, rather than the sending, 
government. Finally, as the number of Chinese international students 
around the globe rises, they are becoming an increasingly visible 
group and consequently the object of intense debates on the potential 
impact of a large body of Chinese students on academic standards, 
campus life, and university revenues around the globe.  
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International students are seen as a source of soft power not only 
by the Chinese government, but also by host countries. Atkinson, for 
instance, argues:  
Soft power advocates, US policy makers, and scholars have fre-
quently claimed that US-hosted educational exchange programs 
might provide one strategy for the United States to effectively en-
gage its ideational adversaries. (Atkinson 2010: 1)  
Western academics, politicians, and university administrators often 
mention potential soft-power gains as a rationale for engaging in 
internationalising education (see for instance Nye 2004; Paradise 
2012; Smirnov 2014). However, concrete studies of the soft-power 
effect of studying abroad, whether on students or receiving countries 
(or both), are scarce. Existing studies tend to be based on surveys 
trying to determine if a stay abroad has made the students more posi-
tively inclined towards their host country (see, for instance, Hong 
2014; Yang 2015), with limited discussion of whether or not a more 
positive attitude actually translates into soft power. There is therefore 
a need for a more nuanced understanding of the role of international 
students as soft-power resources – whether for the sending or receiv-
ing nations. 
This article will explore the linkage between international stu-
dents and soft power and question the assumption that these students 
automatically constitute a soft-power resource for either the sending 
or the receiving nation. I will focus mainly on Chinese international 
students in the West, though Western students in China will some-
times be touched upon in the discussion in order to provide added 
perspectives on the interaction between Chinese and Western stu-
dents. I will begin with a critical discussion of the concept of soft 
power, which is all too often used in contexts where perhaps a con-
cept such as national image would be more appropriate, conflating 
positive attitudes towards a given country with soft power. The pur-
pose of this critical conceptualisation of soft power is to outline two 
different understandings of soft power: a broad definition as simply 
“the power of attraction” and a narrow understanding where the 
focus is on soft power as a true form of power with real behavioural 
outcomes in the form of increased support for the government in 
question. This discussion will be followed by an overview of the ex-
isting research on what is often termed “educational diplomacy”: the 
role of students, teachers, and exchange programmes in public dip-
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lomacy. As I will show, these studies tend to focus solely on changes 
in the attitude towards the host country after the stay abroad, and do 
not provide a nuanced understanding of the linkage between interna-
tional students and soft power.  
In order to provide this nuanced understanding, I will explore 
three areas where there is an apparent linkage between international 
students and soft power: the pre-trip decision-making process based 
on existing imaginaries of the chosen host country; the actual study-
abroad period, with a special focus on the interaction between host 
country and international students; and finally the long-term effects 
of the period abroad in terms of changes in values and worldview. 
Even though changed values do not necessarily lead to changes in 
actual behaviour, we are at least more likely to see these behavioural 
changes in the cases where the period spent studying abroad has led 
to a changed worldview and adoption of host-country values.  
The discussion will be based on existing research as well as a ser-
ies of focus group interviews with Chinese and Danish students in 
Beijing conducted in 2015 and 2016. The Chinese students were from 
two different universities in Beijing and preparing to go abroad in the 
following academic year, while the Danish students were MA stu-
dents in Beijing. The Danish students were not China Studies majors 
and did not study Chinese language, but were from international pro-
grammes within the natural and social sciences with a mixed student 
body of both Chinese and Western students at a larger university in 
Beijing. The role of the Danish students in this discussion is primarily 
to provide extra perspectives on the social interaction between Chi-
nese and Western students. Also, as the Danish students had not 
chosen to study in China out of a specific interest in the country, but 
rather for academic reasons or for personal development, they pro-
vided some interesting insights into the success or failure of the Chi-
nese government’s strategic narratives. I conducted the interviews in 
Danish with the Danish students and in a mixture of Chinese and 
English with the Chinese students – according to their preferences 
and language skills. I had no previous connection with any of the 
students, but my home university does have an exchange agreement 
with the two Chinese universities. Please see Table 1 for more details 
on the focus groups. 
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Table 1. List of Focus Groups 
Group Name Participants 
Focus group 1 
(FG 1) 
Three female Danish graduate students, spending their first 
semester in Beijing in a Sino–Danish joint programme 
Focus group 2 
(FG 2) 
Four female Chinese students: three undergraduates and one 
graduate student, planning to go to Korea, Japan, New Zealand, 
and Austria in the following academic year 
Focus group 3 
(FG 3) 
Three Chinese undergraduate students planning to go to the 
United States in the following academic year 
Focus group 4 
(FG 4) 
Five (one female, four male) Chinese undergraduate students 
planning to go abroad (Canada, Europe, Australia) in the follow-
ing academic year, but their plans had yet to be finalised 
Based on this discussion, I will argue that while international academ-
ic exchange does provide increased intercultural understanding, the 
leap from an international student liking his or her host country to 
actively supporting its policies is very great indeed, and that a stay 
abroad may sometimes have the exact opposite effect and strengthen 
existing worldviews. A much more nuanced understanding of the 
linkage between international students and potential soft-power gains 
for either the host or the sending nation is therefore needed. 
Softness and Attraction: Conceptualising Soft 
Power
When Joseph Nye first defined soft power, his intention was to ex-
plore non-coercive forms of power suitable for maintaining US influ-
ence in a post-Cold War world order. Nye originally defined soft 
power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payment” (Nye 2004: x) and identified the sources 
of soft power as the culture, values, and foreign policies of a given 
nation. He later elaborated on the concept as “the ability to affect 
others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuad-
ing, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred out-
comes” (Nye 2011: 20–21) and added the concept of smart power as 
a combination of soft and hard power.  
Despite its current popularity among policymakers and academ-
ics alike, soft power as a theoretical construct has often been criti-
cised for being analytically vague. The criticism centres on two issues: 
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First, the definition of soft power as inherently different from hard 
power has been questioned. Janice Bially Mattern (2005) argues that 
as soft power depends on representational force, it is not really soft at 
all, but simply another form of hard power, while Takeshi Matsuda 
(2007) demonstrates how the US soft-power efforts in Japan follow-
ing WWII were closely tied to hard power and military might, and 
how the Japanese selected those parts of American culture that were 
suitable for them. Niall Ferguson (2009), on the other hand, claims 
that soft power is too soft to be considered a true form of power. He 
provides the examples of Coke-drinking kids in the Middle East hat-
ing the United States or anglicised Indians plotting the downfall of 
the British Empire to illustrate the difference between adopting vari-
ous parts of a given nation’s cultural make-up and supporting that 
nation’s foreign policy. 
The second problematic aspect of soft power as a theoretical 
construct lies in the difficulty of moving from the concept of “attrac-
tion” to concrete behavioural outcomes in the form of active support 
for another nation. Todd Hall (2010) suggests considering soft power 
not as an analytical category, but as a category of practice and instead 
breaking the “power of attraction” down into smaller categories such 
as representational power, institutional power, and reputational power 
to capture some of the non-coercive forms of power currently rele-
gated to the domain of soft power. Such a distinction would at once 
recognise the need to discuss other forms of power apart from eco-
nomic and military might and sidestep both the analytical vagueness 
of the concept of attraction and the difficulty of making the leap 
from attraction to a given culture to support for the policies of the 
nation-state. As Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin (2014) point 
out, surveys can demonstrate changes in attitudes towards certain 
nations, but it is difficult if not impossible to predict actual behaviour 
based on these surveys.  
As the above discussion shows, there are two rather different 
understandings of the phenomenon normally known as soft power. 
There is the broader, classical understanding of soft power as “the 
power of attraction,” which assumes a direct linkage between liking 
and supporting a nation. The second understanding is largely critical 
of the idea of soft power, and questions the simple assumption of a 
direct transition from liking to supporting a nation and suggests vari-
ous alternatives for discussing non-coercive forms of power.  
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Despite the analytical vagueness discussed above, soft power 
remains a popular concept among both academics and policymakers. 
Researchers have become “mesmerized by concreteness” (Roselle, 
Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin 2014: 71) in trying to measure accurate-
ly any given nation’s soft-power standing through a detailed tallying 
of peacekeeping troops, international students, number of visitors to 
an embassy’s webpage, and the like. For instance, the report The Soft 
Power 30 (McClory 2016) conducts complicated calculations of 30 
nations’ soft-power standing and concludes that the United Kingdom 
has the highest degree of soft power, closely followed by the United 
States, while China ends up at the bottom of the rankings. One of the 
many factors taken into account in calculating how much soft power 
these nations possess is the number of international students they 
receive each year. In this case, international students are taken as 
benefitting the host nation rather than the sending nation in terms of 
soft power. However, as discussed above, it is by no means certain 
that simply receiving international students and inculcating them with 
a liking for greasy fast food or gongbao jiding is enough to generate a 
long-lasting soft-power effect. The following discussion will primarily 
be based on the premise that international students are perceived as a 
soft-power asset to the receiving nation. However, the arguments 
presented below are to a large extent also valid for the idea that inter-
national students can be used as “little ambassadors” by the sending 
nation, as this effect would also be dependent upon a high degree of 
interaction between international students and host-country nationals. 
Most governments make concerted efforts to enhance their soft-
power capabilities by communicating with foreign publics through 
public diplomacy or people-to-people diplomacy. China is no excep-
tion and has increased its efforts in recent years with the establish-
ment of the first Confucius Institutes in 2004 (Hartig 2014) and the 
attempts to reach non-Chinese audiences through major international 
sport events, English-language TV channels, and other means (Tse 
2014). The effect of these efforts is often questioned, especially the 
ability to reach the hearts and minds of Western audiences (Tse 2014; 
Manzenreiter 2010), because of both cultural differences and the 
Chinese style of public diplomacy, which is often directed just as 
much at the domestic audience as at an international audience 
(Blanchard and Lu 2012). While there is a growing understanding of 
the crucial importance of domestic audiences in public diplomacy 
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(d’Hooghe 2014), in the case of China there seems to be an added 
challenge in balancing the messages for domestic and international 
consumption. In addition to this, Wang Yiwei (2008) further outlines 
four major barriers to Chinese public diplomacy: the many actors 
involved in shaping Chinese foreign policy; Western hegemony in 
international affairs; the conditioning of Chinese diplomats towards 
secrecy rather than publicity; and cultural and linguistic impediments, 
which mean that certain Chinese concepts do not translate well 
(Wang 2008: 268). These barriers all point to the wisdom of trying to 
engage non-state actors in public diplomacy in an attempt to elimi-
nate some of the potential misunderstandings by bypassing the gov-
ernment-led diplomatic efforts – hence, the increased focus on inter-
national students as soft-power resources.  
Yet, the question of whether soft power is a meaningful analyti-
cal category remains. In response to the lacking explanatory power of 
the soft-power concept, Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin sug-
gest studying governments’ ability to project strategic narratives and 
to get foreign publics to support these narratives (2014), thereby mir-
roring at least part of Joseph Nye’s later definition of soft power as 
agenda setting (Nye 2011). Soft-power projection through interna-
tional students can consequently be understood as one of two pro-
cesses: either the increased ability to garner support from internation-
al students for narratives projected by the government of their host 
country, or, in the case of the Chinese overseas students acting as 
student ambassadors, the ability of international students to get their 
classmates to support strategic narratives of the Chinese government, 
be it the “Chinese Dream” or the peaceful rise of China. Both these 
processes would entail frequent and intensive contact between host-
country nationals and international students as well as a certain shift 
in values among the target group.  
However, existing research on educational diplomacy tends to 
focus on measuring attitude changes rather than value change among 
former international students, thereby staying firmly within the 
broader understanding of soft power as simply “the power of attrac-
tion.” Yet, a more positive attitude towards the host country reported 
in surveys completed right after a stay abroad tells us little more than 
that the students enjoyed their time abroad, regardless of whether we 
are dealing with Chinese students in the West or Western students in 
China. Conversely, a shift in their belief system, in their support for, 
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for example, democracy, human rights, and the belief in individual 
opportunities – the universalistic values which Joseph Nye describes 
as deeply seductive (Nye 2004: 34), would mean that their positive 
attitude towards the host country was more likely to translate into 
behavioural outcomes. However, as the review of existing literature 
on educational diplomacy below will show, there are few studies that 
successfully avoid a simple conflation of soft-power gains with posi-
tive attitude changes. 
Educational Diplomacy: International Students 
as Soft-Power Tools
Internationalisation of higher education is often linked to the poten-
tial positive soft-power effect of hosting foreign students, but the 
concrete objectives vary in each case. While the European Erasmus 
programme was initiated with the goal of “reinforcing European 
unity through academic mobility” (Carnine 2015: 14), international 
students in the United States are seen as an important tool in “sup-
porting the development of liberal values and practices in authoritar-
ian states” (Atkinson 2010: 19).  
The amount of literature dealing directly with the linkage be-
tween soft power and international students or educational institu-
tions is relatively limited and tends to focus on descriptions of exist-
ing exchange programmes, enumerations of the number of exchange 
students, or surveys on the attitudes of international students after 
their period abroad (see, for instance, Hong 2014; Yang 2015; Para-
dise 2012). In the following, I will begin by discussing the European 
Union’s educational diplomacy in relation to China, as the European 
Union has included this as a major part of their people-to-people 
diplomacy in the so-called “third pillar” of the EU–China strategic 
partnership. Consequently, the European Union’s efforts at educa-
tional diplomacy have been relatively well documented. Natalie Hong 
defines educational diplomacy as  
the practice of utilizing education as a means to facilitate the 
achievement of the foreign policy goals of reshaping perception 
and cultivating goodwill, thus improving international relations. 
(Hong 2014: 156) 
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While the objective of educational diplomacy may be the creation of 
soft power, Hong also recognises the oft-discussed challenge that soft 
power is easier to generate between similar cultures (Hong 2014).  
Hong’s study finds that slightly more than 50 per cent of the 
students from both EU states and China return with a more positive 
impression of their host country, while around 40 per cent return 
with an unchanged impression and less than 10 per cent find that 
their attitude has become more negative as a result of their stay 
abroad (Hong 2014: 166). In addition, unsurprisingly, the vast majori-
ty of returnees find that their understanding of the host culture has 
increased. However, the survey is based on self-reported impressions 
after the stay abroad and does not include attempts to measure atti-
tudes before going abroad, nor does it demonstrate how the attitude 
change can be translated into behavioural outcomes. The expectation 
is that, as Nye states, former exchange students will more or less 
automatically turn into a “reservoir of goodwill” (Hong 2014: 162).  
The Chinese and European students in Hong’s study have widely 
different motivations for choosing, respectively, Europe or China as a 
study destination. Chinese students often believe the academic quality 
in Europe and the United States is higher than in China. They usually 
rank the United States higher than Europe in terms of academic qual-
ity, but going to the United States is seen as difficult and expensive. 
Their top motivations for coming to Europe are the opportunity to 
travel in Europe and the availability of scholarships, making a Euro-
pean education affordable. On the other hand, Europeans going to 
China most often go there with a specific interest in China, learning 
the Chinese language, and gaining a better understanding of Chinese 
culture. Academic quality does not rank high on their list of motiva-
tions. This could change as the increasing number of English-
language programmes in Chinese higher education and joint degrees 
with Western institutions leads to a rapprochement between Chinese 
and Western academic standards. However, the dominant picture 
now is that Western students going to China actively choose China 
because of an interest in the country, while Chinese students often 
choose Europe due to a general interest in going abroad and travel-
ling and not because of a specific interest in their eventual host coun-
try (Hong 2014; Jæger and Gram 2015). 
The European Union’s educational diplomacy strategy is not limit-
ed to student exchange, but also includes, for instance, the Jean 
  Student-to-Student Diplomacy 91 

Monnet Programme, which supports local scholars with an interest in 
European affairs. In a study of this programme, Yang Yifan (2015) 
found that the scholars themselves are positively affected by the pro-
gramme and that more than 70 per cent of their students in China 
report having a more favourable attitude towards the European Union 
after following their classes. However, once again the surveys are 
based on self-reported changes in attitude after taking the class. Yang 
concludes that having Chinese professors teach European affairs is 
an efficient way of influencing public opinion, as in the view of Chi-
nese students a Chinese professor’s favourable attitude towards the 
European Union will have more credibility than that of a European 
professor.  
The studies discussed above all point to a very definite expecta-
tion of positive soft-power outcomes of internationalisation of higher 
education and the educational diplomacy efforts of the European 
Union. However, both of the surveys are based on self-reported 
changes in attitude and do not take into account students’ attitudes 
before they left their home country – if expectations are really low 
beforehand, then it is relatively easy to report an attitude change to-
wards a more positive attitude. As one of the Danish students from 
the focus group interviews (FG 1) said when asked why her attitude 
towards China had become more positive: “My expectations before 
coming to China were really low. So every time something actually 
works out OK, I’m positively surprised.” She had been prepared for 
many practical challenges in her academic and daily life in China, and 
expected to meet a number of institutional challenges while living in 
China. 
These institutional challenges form one of the major barriers to 
the internationalisation of higher education. While the European 
Erasmus programme is a well-established and well-known exchange 
programme, there are many institutional stumbling blocks on the way 
to internationalisation of education – especially with the rapid growth 
in Chinese international students putting pressure on the most popu-
lar host nations and joint ventures between Chinese and Western 
educational institutions struggling to overcome cultural and bureau-
cratic challenges. Trilokekar (2010) points out that “internationaliza-
tion is often confused with globalization [... and] while globalization 
may be unalterable, internationalization involves many choices” 
(Trilokekar 2010: 144) and concludes that institutional hindrances in 
  92 Ane Bislev 

the form of lack of academics in policymaking circles and a shifting 
foreign-policy focus form major obstacles to true internationalisation 
of universities. This is borne out by, for instance, James Paradise’s 
study of Chinese internationalisation efforts in higher education 
(2012). Paradise discusses some of the many difficulties on the road 
towards internationalisation, especially when it comes to the foreign 
campuses being built in China:  
All is not well on the implementation front. Delays are quite long. 
Rules and regulations may not be transparent, and a variety of 
players – at the many different institutional and governmental lev-
els, often with conflicting interests, are involved. Negotiating in-
ternational agreements is never easy, and the combination of Chi-
na’s bureaucracy and the inherent complexities of academic col-
laboration add up to a highly complex situation. (Altbach (2012) 
quoted in Paradise (2012)) 
These complexities mean that the effect of a study-abroad period in 
China is quite varied in terms of soft-power effects, although his final 
conclusion is that the students will return with at least a “measure of 
goodwill” (Paradise 2012: 203) towards China. Smirnov (2014) also 
discusses this linkage between practical institutional issues and poten-
tial soft-power effects in an analysis of Russia’s lack of success in 
attracting international students. He sees a huge untapped potential 
for Russia in its neighbouring countries where young people today 
speak English rather than Russian as their second language. He puts 
this down to the successful efforts of the United States to attract the 
best and brightest from among the young generation and regrets that 
Russia has no similar approach. However, he also points to the prac-
tical difficulties in imitating the United States, which include but are 
not limited to the lack of infrastructure for the internationalisation of 
higher education and the fact that conditions for students in Russia 
are so unfavourable that international students might return home 
with a negative impression of the country (Smirnov 2014).  
The studies discussed above demonstrate the institutional hin-
drances to internationalisation of higher education and the conse-
quent barriers to soft-power generation, but do not question the soft-
power effect of international exchange once a country succeeds in 
attracting foreign students and creating a benign framework for their 
stay abroad. In a rare study that goes beyond asking about attitude 
changes during a stay abroad, Atkinson (2010) discusses the soft-
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power gain of US-hosted educational exchange programmes and 
concludes that these programmes do play a role in developing liberal 
values among the participants (Atkinson 2010). However, she also 
outlines the circumstances under which such soft-power gains can be 
expected to be realised, setting up three conditions that have to be 
met in order for this change in values to occur: a depth of social in-
teraction while abroad, a shared sense of identity or community be-
tween participants and their hosts and, finally, the attainment of a 
position of influence upon returning home (Atkinson 2010: 2). These 
conditions are best met in programmes targeting certain professional 
groups – for example, military officers being trained at US military 
bases and “living democracy” while sharing a professional identity 
and having already obtained an influential position in their home 
country. However, in her study the soft-power effect of “normal” 
international student exchange is less clear, as the relatively isolated 
foreign students do not necessarily have intensive social interaction 
with host-country students, experience a sense of community, or gain 
powerful positions upon returning home.  
The three conditions that Atkinson outlines (social interaction, 
shared sense of community, position upon return) combined with the 
discussion of the European Union exchange programme and the 
institutional hindrances paint a picture of the conditions under which 
international students can potentially lead to soft-power gains. First, 
the pre-trip imaginaries are quite important for the actual experience 
while abroad and consequently for the following impression of the 
host country. Second, the depth of actual interaction with host-
country nationals plays a crucial role in determining the outcome in 
terms of cultural understanding and potential soft-power gains. Final-
ly, the long-term effects will be determined by both the changes in 
values and worldview and the future position of the international 
students. These three phases in a study-abroad experience will be 
used as the framework for the following discussion of the linkage 
between soft power and Chinese international students and interna-
tional students in China. 
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Chinese Students Abroad / International
Students in China 
While the discussion below mainly centres on the question of whether 
Chinese international students can be considered a soft-power re-
source by either the host or the sending nation, I have chosen to add 
a few perspectives from a focus group of international students in 
China. These perspectives mainly serve to illustrate the difficulty of 
cross-cultural socialising, and thereby add some important nuances to 
the discussion.  
Leaving: Imaginaries and Decision Making 
As indicated above, the motivations of Chinese students in travelling 
to the West and of Western students in travelling to China differ in 
several important aspects, not least in the pre-trip imaginaries of the 
potential host country. In her remarkable exploration of the overseas 
experiences of students from a northern Chinese city, Vanessa Fong 
(2011) demonstrates how “the developed world” is often held in high 
regard among the potential international students, who often idealise 
the countries they aim to visit. These students already perceive them-
selves as part of an educated elite and strive for developed-world 
citizenship, something that is more easily achievable through a study 
period abroad. Fong demonstrates how filial nationalism causes these 
students to be loyal despite the perceived relative “backwardness” of 
their own nation, and how most of them tend to wish to return home 
or to ensure in other ways that their overseas experience will benefit 
China, though they often express scepticism towards other Chinese 
students’ altruistic/patriotic motives. She also finds a clear ranking of 
potential overseas destinations with the United States as a clear first 
choice, the United Kingdom a close second, and Ireland and Austral-
ia as acceptable substitutes. Highly developed Asian nations such as 
Korea and Japan are also acceptable, as it is easier and less expensive 
to go there, while Singapore is considered “too Chinese.” This 
matches Hong’s (2014) findings, insofar as the United States is the 
preferred destination in terms of perceived academic quality, while 
Europe is attractive to Chinese students mostly because of the oppor-
tunities for travelling to several countries and because of the available 
scholarships. 
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The preexisting imaginaries of the West as a highly developed 
and paradisiacal place often result in disappointment during the actual 
stay abroad, when privileged college students from China sometimes 
find themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy, working as dishwash-
ers or in other menial, labour-intensive jobs that they would never 
have engaged in back in China. This is perhaps especially true for 
students who begin by taking language courses in the hopes of im-
proving their English skills to enable them to enter a proper universi-
ty programme and whose overseas experience is therefore often pro-
tracted and insecure (Fong 2011).  
In a study of migration decisions among Chinese college stu-
dents, Gong and Huybers (2015) find that, like any other migration 
decision, the decision to study abroad is based on both push and pull 
factors. Push factors for choosing to study abroad include lack of 
opportunities at home, immigration prospects, and the perceived low 
quality of domestic education. The pull factors include, for instance, 
academic reputation, safety, costs, and proximity. Their study shows 
three predominant factors in Chinese students’ choice of a study 
destination: Safety is the most important factor – students are unlike-
ly to go to a country perceived as unsafe. Educational quality, under-
stood as a combination of overall country reputation and individual 
university rankings, is an important factor in the decision-making 
process. Finally, on a more practical note, the expected expenditure 
for the journey itself, for living expenses, and for tuition is of course 
an important determinant in the feasibility of the migration decision. 
While these three factors together create a rational framework for 
making the migration transition, Fong finds that the actual decision 
to go abroad is not always based on transparent and logical reasoning:  
At the individual level, migration decisions were based not on a 
rational analysis, but rather on subjective responses to a series of 
events that seemed unpredictable to those who experienced them. 
(Fong 2011: 94)  
The decision to study abroad and the choice of a destination country 
are consequently based on a series of complicated factors that include 
very concrete issues like costs and educational quality as well as less 
generalisable elements determined by the concrete background of the 
potential overseas students and the students’ own preconceived no-
tions of potential host countries.  
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My focus group interviews demonstrate just how varied this pre-
conception can be – and how this impression is often based on 
communication with friends and family with previous experience of 
the chosen country as well as on current media stories. For instance, 
two male students (FG 4) had recently started to focus on Canada 
rather than the United States or Europe as a potential destination for 
a very specific reason: the negative discourse on migration in both the 
United States and Europe. “I don’t want to go where I’m not wel-
come.” They knew, of course, that the migration crisis and the con-
sequent scepticism towards migrants in Europe was not directed 
specifically towards Chinese students, but felt that this was still a very 
good reason to select a country that was more immigration-friendly. 
One of the female undergraduate students expressed exactly the same 
fear when asked about what she saw as the major challenge of her 
coming stay in Austria: “I’m afraid that the anti-foreign sentiments 
will influence daily interactions [with local Austrians].” While the 
other three female students in the focus group all had friends and 
acquaintances in the countries they were going to, she was alone in 
relying on publicly available information and university websites to 
gain knowledge about her chosen destination. In both of these cases, 
we see strategic narratives projected by the Canadian and Austrian 
governments as being, respectively, immigration-friendly and immi-
gration-hostile being internalised by the Chinese students and influ-
encing their choice of destination.  
Another theme that came up frequently in the focus group dis-
cussions especially in relation to the United States and Western Eu-
rope was freedom – arguably another strategic narrative projected at 
least by the United States. In a discussion of the relative merits of 
living in the United States and China, one student politely praised the 
academic and personal freedom to be gained by studying in the Unit-
ed States, but was instantly challenged by one of the younger students 
who believed that “every place has its positive and negative sides,” 
arguing that “you cannot say that one country is better than another.” 
However, most of the students in the Chinese focus groups men-
tioned personal freedom as well as freedom from social and academic 
pressure as major reasons for wanting to study abroad. This some-
times came at the cost of added pressure after returning from the 
semester abroad, but was still considered worthwhile (FG 2).  
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On one point, they agreed: the higher quality of the educational 
system in the United States. Even though the United States is per-
ceived as a problematic destination in terms of personal safety (FG 2 
and FG 3), the students who had succeeded in getting a scholarship 
to the United States were congratulated by the other students in the 
group who were going to less prestigious destinations such as Korea 
and Japan. When asked where they would go if they had complete 
freedom of choice, the students in FG 2 who were going to countries 
other than the United States all replied that they would have chosen 
the United States, had they had the option. However, gaining admis-
sion to a good university in the United States was perceived as ex-
ceedingly difficult and the tuition fees seen as forbiddingly high. In 
addition, the positive experience of acquaintances in, for instance, 
Japan and Korea, and even language difficulties shifted the final deci-
sion in another direction. Again, it can be argued that the strategic 
narrative constituted by international university rankings and the 
value of a liberal education had been completely internalised by these 
students.  
The above discussion of the motivations and pre-trip imaginaries 
of potential international students illuminates one aspect of the link-
age between soft power and international students: the role of soft 
power in shaping the decision to study abroad. Soft power in its 
broader definition as “the power of attraction” is certainly relevant in 
the germination of the desire to study in a given country and in the 
creation of the clear preferences for some destinations over others. 
However, as the focus group interviews demonstrated, the picture is 
actually much more complicated than a simple ranking in terms of 
the relative attractiveness of certain destinations would reveal. The 
students were generally quite well-informed about potential host 
countries, and while certain strategic narratives – for instance, the 
value of a liberal education and personal freedom – were broadly 
accepted, this did not lead to an uncritical support for the United 
States. On the contrary, many elements of life in the United States, 
such as lack of personal safety and hostility to foreigners, were draw-
backs that had to be weighed against the benefit of a high-quality 
educational system. Furthermore, if we consider the question of actu-
al behavioural outcomes, though most of the students had at some 
point dreamed of going to the United States and accepted the idea of 
American academic superiority wholeheartedly, only a minority had 
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ended up applying to colleges in the United States, while most of 
them had applied elsewhere for a variety of reasons. Therefore, the 
attitude towards a given country certainly played a role in shaping the 
initial selection of potential destinations, but when it came to the 
actual process of applying for a period abroad many other factors 
came into play, not least personal communications from friends, 
relatives, and acquaintances who had already studied abroad. The 
concrete overseas experience of these informants consequently 
played a large role in determining where their friends back home 
would go.  
Living Abroad: The International Experience 
As outlined in the preceding section, the intensity of social interaction 
as well as a shared sense of community are crucial for potential soft-
power gains. In the following, I will discuss the actual interaction 
between Chinese and foreign students inside and outside the class-
room and demonstrate how preexisting cultural imaginaries some-
times create a boundary that hinders the development of a shared 
sense of community.  
The remarkable rise in the number of Chinese students going 
abroad to study has also meant that their backgrounds are becoming 
increasingly diverse. Studying overseas is no longer only possible for 
the economic and academic elite but is within reach of lower-middle-
class students whose families invest heavily in their children’s over-
seas experience. This diversity means that Chinese overseas students 
have different expectations of their time abroad and that their pre-
conditions for engaging in student life abroad vary. Yet, Chinese 
overseas students are often perceived as a homogeneous group that 
creates a series of very specific problems for their host institutions by 
not participating actively in class activities, maintaining social segrega-
tion, and taking a rather instrumentalist approach to their studies 
(Ross and Chen 2015).  
The Chinese students abroad have to negotiate their own inter-
nal group identification and the external categorisation of themselves 
as belonging to the category of “Chinese international student.” The 
local conception of the Chinese student plays a large role in determin-
ing their actual experience overseas and varies between nations. In a 
study of Chinese students in Japan, Jamie Coates (2015) demonstrates 
how the negative impression in Japan of young Chinese men, in par-
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ticular, contributes to the feeling of social isolation among Chinese 
students and leads to the desire not to be recognised as Chinese, but 
to pass as locals, which is of course only possible in non-verbal situa-
tions. In the United States, the popular representation and external 
perception of Chinese students centres on their passiveness and lack 
of integration with students from other nations. In a study of a large 
Midwestern university, Chen and Ross (2015) show how the very 
large Chinese student body has created a parallel version of many of 
the typical features of American college life in the form of Chinese 
sports clubs and extracurricular activities. In this way, they create a 
safe space for themselves to practise college life and become active 
participants, even though they still do not feel comfortable joining, 
for instance, a “mixed” basketball team.  
These cultural imaginaries also create many potential pitfalls in 
classroom interaction where lack of familiarity with cultural codes 
often blocks mutual understanding between Chinese students and 
Western teachers. Wang Yu (2014) explores Chinese students’ en-
counters with British humour and finds that the misunderstandings 
created by the self-deprecating jokes from a lecturer actually lead to a 
heightened tension between the Chinese students and the university. 
The basis for this misunderstanding is the different perception of the 
roles of students and teachers – which in this case led the Chinese 
students to believe that the teacher found them lazy, while his inten-
tion was to imply that his classes were boring. This clash of under-
standing of the roles of students and teachers can be witnessed in US 
classrooms as well, where Chinese students’ polite silence is perceived 
as a lack of engagement in the classroom and not as a sign of respect 
for the professor and their classmates (Ross and Chen 2015). 
Both in the classroom and in social interactions, language skills 
play an important role in determining the extent of social integration. 
According to both the Chinese and the Danish students in the focus 
groups, true relaxation mainly happens among co-nationals. The Chi-
nese students in FG 2 discussed the different interpretation of the 
term “friendship” when asked whether they had ever had a non-
Chinese friend. Most of them had met foreigners in various social 
settings at their university, but had found it difficult to navigate the 
cultural codes surrounding social interactions.  
I met this girl from Italy who was studying at our university. She 
wanted us to go out for coffee, though we had only just met, and I 
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didn’t like that. But later I thought that maybe it was just her hab-
its, her culture which made her ask. (FG 2)  
Furthermore, the Chinese students said that they found foreigners’ 
definition of friendship quite different.  
We [referring to Chinese students in general] see friendship as 
something that can be based on helping each other in class; the 
foreigners always wanted to do stuff together right away.  
This matches Ross and Chen’s findings from the United States, 
where Chinese students find the Americans very open and engaging 
at the beginning of an acquaintance, but lack the progression from 
slightly guarded acquaintance to a true and long-lasting friendship 
that they would expect from a purely Chinese friendship (Ross and 
Chen 2015).   
This difficulty in forming close-knit relationships between Chi-
nese and Western students was often felt by Western students in 
China as well. The Danish students in the focus group interviews in 
Beijing had been in China for three months at the time of the inter-
views. In the first couple of months, they had been strongly urged by 
the university staff to find activities that they and their Chinese 
classmates all enjoyed. Nevertheless, after a few months of trying out 
karaoke bars and arranging parties with no alcohol, they had more or 
less given up (FG 1). This was partly interpreted as a problem related 
to differences in social preferences, partly as a question of the Chi-
nese students’ extremely limited spare time. Even though the students 
were part of the same graduate programme, the Danish students had 
much more spare time, as the Chinese students were expected to do 
work assigned by their supervisor outside the regular curriculum.  
The above examples all point to the challenges inherent in social 
interaction between Chinese and Western classmates both inside and 
outside the classroom, and to the consequent hindrances to the de-
velopment of a shared sense of community as simply students, not 
always “Chinese” and “Western” students. Language skills play a 
major role in this as do different cultural expectations of what consti-
tutes friendships and the roles of teachers and students. The students 
in the focus groups were very quick to relegate differences in social 
preferences to the realm of cultural difference, as in the case of the 
hasty Italian suggestion of a cup of coffee. Both the Chinese and 
Western students had clear ideas of the difficulties of bridging these 
  Student-to-Student Diplomacy 101 

differences – having also been repeatedly urged to overcome them by 
teachers and university staff. In this case, we see certain narratives 
being perpetuated by both Chinese and Western students, as well as 
their teachers. Both my focus group interviews and other sources 
(e.g. Ross and Chen 2015) thereby demonstrate that one of the major 
preconditions for considering international students as a potential 
soft-power resource – namely, frequent social interaction – is quite 
difficult to meet in the case of Chinese international students in a 
Western context. In the following section, I will discuss the potential 
for challenging some of these preconceived notions and bringing 
about changes in values and worldview.  
Returning – Changed Attitudes and Values? 
“When I left China, I considered myself a liberal. After living here, I 
have become much more conservative” (Chinese international stu-
dent at Aalborg University). I began this paper by arguing that in 
order for international students to be a true soft-power resource, we 
would need to see a shift in values during their time abroad and not 
just a more positive impression of the host country. The central 
theme of the focus group interviews with the Chinese students dis-
cussed earlier was their pre-trip imaginaries, and it has not been part 
of the research design to track the informants while abroad or to 
conduct follow-up interviews with them after their return to China in 
order to explore the potential changes in their worldview. However, 
existing studies tackle the question of the effect of a period abroad on 
the values and worldview of Chinese international students. While 
some studies suggest that changing college students’ values is difficult 
(Hollway 2005) and takes a concerted effort, a number of studies 
from the 1980s and 1990s demonstrate how values among Chinese 
international students actually did change during their time abroad 
(see Guan and Dodder 2001 for further discussion of this). However, 
this shift in values does not represent a unidirectional acceptance of 
host-country values; rather, it is a bidirectional process. Some values 
shift towards host-country values, while other previously held values 
and beliefs become more important during the stay abroad, as the 
normally invisible cultural rules – the so-called “hidden controls” 
(Hall 1976) of human behaviour patterns – become exposed through 
immersion in an unfamiliar environment. This exposure challenges 
deeply held beliefs and cultural codes and can lead to these beliefs 
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becoming further entrenched through a conscious defence of familiar 
values in unfamiliar environments. As Hansen and Thøgersen point 
out, the unfamiliar is interpreted through the familiar, but the familiar 
can also be reinterpreted through the unfamiliar. This questioning of 
the familiar can also be sharpened in political discussions, where Chi-
nese students are held accountable for CCP policies and where the 
negotiation of intercultural identities is consequently not necessarily a 
harmonious process (Hansen and Thøgersen 2015). 
Gu (2015) has demonstrated how Chinese international students 
actually become both more firmly committed to their own culture 
and more understanding towards the host culture during their time 
abroad. However, as the quote from the Chinese international stu-
dent at Aalborg University at the beginning of this section illustrates, 
sometimes the interaction actually leads to defensiveness and en-
trenchment rather than a greater intercultural understanding. In a 
study of Chinese international students in Hawaii, Henry Chiu Hail 
shows how the perceived harsh and unfair criticism of China from 
American classmates led Chinese students to retract into a defensive 
patriotic positioning, where they felt the need to defend China against 
misrepresentation (Hail 2015). This brings us full circle to the quote 
at the beginning of this article from the Chinese Ministry of Educa-
tion, speaking of harnessing overseas students as people-to-people 
ambassadors. The students from Hail’s study seem to cast themselves 
in this role rather reluctantly out of a sense of duty to not let obvious-
ly “wrong” statements pass unchallenged. However, his study also 
demonstrates how classroom environments can actually be conducive 
to creating a more positive setting for discussion by openly address-
ing the challenges of intercultural understanding. Without this help in 
setting the scene, the discussion of China’s problems can be quite 
unpleasant to the Chinese students. 
When the Chinese students planning to go abroad were asked 
during focus group interviews whether they thought of themselves as 
representatives of China when abroad, initially none of them had 
considered this issue. Their answers typically centred on how their 
personal behaviour would reflect upon China, but their attitudes were 
mixed. After discussing the behaviour of foreigners in China and then 
turning to her own plans to go abroad, one student said:  
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Of course I will do my best to behave well when abroad, but I am 
only one individual and my behaviour reflects mainly on me per-
sonally and not on China. (FG 3) 
However, after a few minutes of reflection in one of the other focus 
groups, the students remembered teachers and supervisors urging 
them to behave well when abroad, telling them, “After you have left 
the country, whenever you do anything, you have to think of the 
consequences; remember you are Chinese” (FG 2). I asked them if 
they had ever considered foreigners’ behaviour in China as a reflec-
tion on their home countries. Initially they said that no, this was not 
the case, but after a few minutes of discussion they all agreed that if 
they did not know much about the country in question, it would of 
course influence their attitude towards that nation. One student who 
had visited Korea said that she had met many Korean students in 
Beijing who were quite lazy, but had discovered that Korean students 
in Korea worked at least as hard as Chinese students. 
This relatively nuanced discussion of the role of foreign students 
as representatives of their home countries contrasted with the Danish 
students, who had already spent a couple of months in China and felt 
quite strongly that they represented “the West.” They were acutely 
aware of the cases where their male Danish classmates had misbe-
haved towards Chinese female classmates. Additionally, they had 
themselves become aware of how their own behaviour in, for in-
stance, a crowded subway car could be perceived as reflecting not 
only upon their home countries but upon the entire Western world 
(FG 1). This difference between students planning to go abroad and 
students already in the middle of their international experience may 
be seen as reflecting the exposure of “the hidden controls” men-
tioned above (Hall 1976), as the Chinese students had yet to experi-
ence the contrast between their home and host cultures first-hand. 
The Danish students were highly aware of the situations where be-
having “Danishly” laid them open to criticism and censure, since they 
had experienced this personally. While the Chinese students, who 
were still living in Beijing, were quite aware of the dangers of assum-
ing that one foreigner represented his or her home country on an 
intellectual level, they sometimes fell into this way of thinking anyway 
on a subconscious and emotional level.  
While changes in values and an adjusted worldview do not in 
themselves guarantee behavioural outcomes in terms of active sup-
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port for the host nation, they do at least signify more profound ef-
fects of the stay abroad than simply a lingering fondness for the host 
country. However, just as the pre-trip imaginaries and the actual 
overseas experience vary significantly, so does the outcome in terms 
of changes in values and worldview. The outcome depends on the 
attitude of host-country students and teachers, as well as on the stu-
dents’ own perception of themselves as informal ambassadors of 
their country.  
Conclusion 
Chinese international students have become a major presence in ter-
tiary education around the globe. Consequently, interest in these stu-
dents has grown. Universities have an economic interest in the rev-
enue generated by accepting them and in trying to create a framework 
for successfully integrating Chinese students into the general student 
body. Researchers have dealt with almost every aspect of these stu-
dents’ international experience, from the initial decision-making pro-
cess to the final life-changing outcomes of their time abroad. More-
over, policymakers from host countries and from China view them as 
a potential source of soft power. In this article, I have questioned the 
simple assumption that international students automatically generate 
increased soft power for either the sending or the host nation. Most 
Western literature deals with international students as a source of soft 
power for the host government, but Chinese overseas students are 
apparently claimed as soft-power resources by both the Chinese gov-
ernment and the host communities.  
Answering the question of when international students can be 
seen as a source of soft power is complicated by the analytical vague-
ness of the concept of soft power. If we use the broad definition of 
soft power as merely “the power of attraction” and the simple meas-
urement of soft power as improved attitude towards a given nation, 
then the straightforward answer is yes, international students do con-
stitute a soft-power tool. Surveys show increased positive attitudes 
towards the host country following a stay abroad. In addition, we do 
see evidence that both Chinese students in the West and Western 
students in China think of themselves as representing their home 
countries, therefore more or less willingly fulfilling the proposed role 
as student ambassadors. 
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However, if we use a narrower definition of soft power as a true 
form of power, with a definite behavioural outcome, then the picture 
becomes much more complicated. Existing studies do find that under 
certain conditions educational exchange programmes can be condu-
cive to soft-power generation. However, as the discussion of Chinese 
international students demonstrates, some of these conditions are 
difficult to meet in the case of Sino-Western educational collabora-
tion. Cultural and political differences, preconceived notions of the 
“other,” and structural barriers in the educational system all mean 
that the long-term outcome in terms of value change and accultura-
tion from a semester or two at a foreign university is quite limited, 
especially when dealing with Chinese students in a Western setting – 
or, for that matter, Western students in China.  
A recent incident in the spring of 2017 at an American college il-
lustrates the complexity involved in assuming that international stu-
dents automatically constitute a source of soft power. The college had 
invited the Dalai Lama to speak at the university’s commencement 
ceremony, but Chinese students protested strongly against this, argu-
ing that the visit would go against diversity and political correctness, 
as he, in their view, represents an oppressive regime (Horwitz 2017). 
In this case, the Chinese students had selectively adopted the lan-
guage and forms of protest associated with liberal values in order to 
further a Chinese political agenda. The students in the focus groups 
likewise showed that while they had internalised certain narratives 
about their future host countries, they possessed nuanced and well-
informed opinions that transcended the simplified process of first 
liking and then supporting these nations. This process is not a 
straight journey from point A to point B, but involves many twists 
and turns along the way – and gets longer and more complicated 
when the difference between the host nation’s and sending nation’s 
culture and values is large. There is no doubt that a stay abroad is an 
important and transformative experience and that most students will 
gain some measure of intercultural understanding, but in the case of 
Chinese international students this cannot automatically be translated 
into soft-power gains. International students can be expected to pro-
vide “a measure of goodwill” and increased intercultural understand-
ing. Whether they will actually “want what we want” remains, how-
ever, an open question. 
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